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In the present letter, we propose a more general entangling operator to the quantization of Cournot
economic model, in which players can access to a continuous set of strategies. By analyzing the
relation between the von Neumann entropy of the entangled state and the total profit of two players
precisely, we find that the total profit at the Nash equilibrium always achieves its maximal value as
long as the entropy tends to infinity. Moreover, since the asymmetry is introduced in the entangled
state, the quantum model shows some kind of ”encouraging” and ”suppressing” effect in profit
functions of different players.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory has experienced a great development
since early time of last century through its wide appli-
cation in nearly every aspect of our modern society. In
recent few years, along with the thriving of quantum in-
formation, a newly-emerging field, quantum game has
begun to attract much attention due to the intimate
connection between the theory of game and the theory
of quantum communication [1]. This field was initiated
by a paper of Meyer, finding that a player can always
beats his classical opponent by adopting quantum strate-
gies on the coin tossing game [2]. Later, Eisert et al.
[1] introduced quantum entanglement into the famous
Prisoners’ Dilemma, by which the contradiction existing
in the classical scenario vanishes. Since then, quantum
game theory has developed rapidly and exhibited great
superiority over its classical counterpart in later works
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. In addition to the-
oretical investigations, Du et al. realized the quantum
Prisoners’ Dilemma in experiments for the first time [14],
and therefore constructed a practical base for quantum
game.
However, most of previous investigations on quan-
tum game mainly focused on game models with discrete
strategies set. In Li et al.’s paper [16], they first put for-
ward a quantization scheme for Cournot duopoly, a fa-
mous economical model even preceding the birth of game
theory [15], in which two players can virtually cooperate
and get the optimal profit at the maximal quantum en-
tanglement between them albeit both act ”selfishly” just
as they do in the classical case. This work actually set up
a foundation for further discussions regarding quantum
game with continuous strategies [17, 18, 19]. Recently
Qin et al. introduced a quantization scheme for asym-
metric games [20]. The key modification of their scheme
compared with Li et al.’s is the adoption of two differ-
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ent entanglement factors, which ensure the asymmetric
games to get the optimal cooperative profit. Neverthe-
less, Qin et al.’s quantum scheme can still be regarded
as a fair play, for the two factors are determined by the
extent of the asymmetry of the game. It is quite often
that various environments may affect the quantum game,
leading to asymmetric forms of the entanglement opera-
tor.
Hence, to better understand the property of quantum
game, it’s worthwhile studying the distinctive features of
quantum game resulted from the change of the entan-
glement operator. In this letter we develop the quan-
tum model of Cournot’s duopoly proposed by Li et al.
by changing the initial state before actually entangling
them, and we define these operations altogether as a
whole entangling operation. Thus it can be discovered
that the total profit at the unique Nash equilibrium will
increase monotonously as long as the entropy of the en-
tangled state, namely the entanglement, tends to infinity.
While, considering the lack of symmetry in this quanti-
zation scheme, our result will not remain Pareto optimal
(the best result that can be achieved without disadvan-
taging at least one group), which in fact may not be
a necessity in the real world because of the simple fact
that there is no absolutely-impartial law. Besides, all
of the operators we cite in the quantization of Cournot
duopoly can be realized experimentally within the capac-
ity of modern optical technology through proper design.
II. COURNOT DUOPOLY
Now we briefly recall the classical Cournot duopoly.
Duopoly is an economic condition in which two firms
hold the market of a certain commodity without a third
competitor. In Cournot model, two firms are assumed
to produce a homogeneous product and simultaneously
decide their quantities q1 and q2. and the price of this
2FIG. 1: The quantum structure of the game.
product is decided by the quantities as
p =
{
a−Q (Q < a),
0 (Q ≥ a), (1)
whereQ is the total quantity of two firms, i.e. Q = q1+q2
and a is a constant. Assume that the unit cost of the
product is also a constant c, the profit function of each
firm would be:
Uj = qj(p− c) = qj(k − (q1 + q2)), (2)
with k = a − c > 0 and j = 1, 2. It’s easy to work out
the unique Nash equilibrium:
q∗1 = q
∗
2 =
k
3
,
u∗1 = u
∗
2 =
k2
9
. (3)
However, the Nash equilibrium is not the optimal solu-
tion for the market. If the two firms cooperate and raise
their total quantity to k/2, they can acquire the highest
total profit k2/4. In addition, by keeping the symmetry
of the model, we can obtain the Pareto optimal in the
following solution:
q∗1 = q
∗
2 =
k
4
,
u∗1 = u
∗
2 =
k2
8
. (4)
The profit difference between the optimal choice and
the Nash equilibrium reflects the conflict between indi-
vidual rationality and collective rationality, just like in
the classical prisoners’ dilemma.
III. QUANTIZATION OF CLASSICAL MODEL
Here we put forward a modified quantization model
of Li et al.’s [16], where we make use of two single-
mode electromagnetic fields. Fig. 1 shows the quantum
structure of the game. As a extension, we first apply
two single-mode squeezing operator Sˆ1 ⊗ Sˆ to the vac-
uum state, where Sˆj = exp(
γj
2
aj
2 − γj
2
a†j
2), and a†j , aj
are the creation and annihilation operator of the corre-
sponding field, followed by a two-mode squeezing opera-
tor Sˆ12 = exp(γa1a2−γa†1a†2) of a two-mode electromag-
netic field. Thus the total entanglement operator would
be:
Jˆ(γ1, γ2, γ12) = Sˆ12Sˆ1Sˆ2
= exp[γ12(a1a2 − a†1a†2)]
· exp[γ1(a12 − a†12)/2]
· exp[γ2(a22 − a†22)/2], (5)
with constraint γ1, γ2, γ12 ∈ R and γ12 ≥ 0 (which also
is an extension of Li et al ’s model). Apparently, we can
turn back to Li et al ’s entanglement operator if γ1 = γ2 =
0. The strategies in the set of local unitary operators is
Dˆj(xj) = exp[xj(a
†
j−aj)/
√
2] as the scheme of Li et al.’s.
The final measurement is made corresponding to the
observables Xˆj = (a
†
j+aj)/
√
2, which in quantum optics
is the amplitude quadrature (we can simply perceive it as
the ”position” operator). This measurement is done by
the homodyne measurement assuming that the state is
infinitely squeezed. Correspondingly, by citing the phase
quadrature Pˆj = i(a
†
j−aj)/
√
2 (which can be seen as the
”momentum” operator), we can rewrite the entanglement
operator and the strategies in the following form:
Jˆ(γ1, γ2, γ12) = exp[iγ12(Xˆ1Pˆ2 + Xˆ2Pˆ1)]
· exp[iγ1(Xˆ1Pˆ1 + Pˆ1Xˆ1)/2]
· exp[iγ2(Xˆ2Pˆ2 + Pˆ2Xˆ2)/2], (6)
Dˆj(xj) = exp(−ixjPˆj), j = 1, 2. (7)
Obviously, the classical Cournot duopoly is only a spe-
cial case with γ12 = 0 in its quantum extension. Because
the strategy set is not extended compared to its classical
counterpart, we can be sure that all the features shown
in the quantization version attribute to the entanglement
of the states. The specific property of the entangled state
is analyzed in the paragraphs below.
By detailed calculation we get:
Jˆ†Dˆ1(x1)Jˆ = exp[−ix1(Pˆ1eγ1 cosh γ12 + Pˆ2eγ2 sinh γ12)],
(8)
Jˆ†Dˆ2(x2)Jˆ = exp[−ix2(Pˆ2eγ2 cosh γ12 + Pˆ1eγ1 sinh γ12)].
(9)
Therefore the final state reads:
|ψf 〉 = Jˆ†(Dˆ1 ⊗ Dˆ2) |ψi〉
= exp[−ieγ1(x1 cosh γ12 + x2 sinh γ12)Pˆ1] |vac〉1
⊗ exp[−ieγ2(x2 cosh γ12 + x1 sinh γ12)Pˆ2] |vac〉2 .
(10)
3And the measurement gives the respective quantity of
each firm player:
q1 = e
γ1(x1 cosh γ12 + x2 sinh γ12), (11)
q2 = e
γ2(x2 cosh γ12 + x1 sinh γ12). (12)
Simply by substituting the above into the classical
profit functions (see Eq. (2)), we get the quantum profit:
uQ1 (x1, x2) = e
γ1(x1 cosh γ12 + x2 sinh γ12)p(x1, x2),
(13)
uQ2 (x1, x2) = e
γ2(x2 cosh γ12 + x1 sinh γ12)p(x1, x2),
(14)
where p(x1, x2) = [k − x1(eγ1 cosh γ12 + eγ2 sinh γ12) −
x2(e
γ2 cosh γ12 + e
γ1 sinh γ12)].
Solving the Nash equilibrium equations we obtain the
unique solution:
x∗1 =
keγ2 cosh γ12
(eγ1 + eγ2) sinh 2γ12 + eγ1+γ2(2 cosh 2γ12 + 1)
,
(15)
x∗2 =
keγ1 cosh γ12
(eγ1 + eγ2) sinh 2γ12 + eγ1+γ2(2 cosh 2γ12 + 1)
.
(16)
And the profit at the equilibrium reads:
uQ1 (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) =
cosh γ12(cosh γ12 + e
∆γ sinh γ12)
2(cosh γ12 + e
−∆γ sinh γ12)
(1 + 2 cosh 2γ12 + 2 cosh∆γ sinh 2γ12)2
k2, (17)
uQ2 (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) =
cosh γ12(cosh γ12 + e
−∆γ sinh γ12)
2(cosh γ12 + e
∆γ sinh γ12)
(1 + 2 cosh 2γ12 + 2 cosh∆γ sinh 2γ12)2
k2, (18)
where ∆γ = γ1 − γ2. Apparently, the profit functions
only depend on two parameters γ12 and ∆γ. In addition,
if we make γ1 = γ2 = 0, i.e. ∆γ = 0, it’s easy to find that
the result is exactly that of Li et al in their quantization
scheme.
IV. ENTROPY & ASYMMETRY
Using the method put forward in Rendell’s paper [21],
we write the entangled state in the representation of ”po-
sition”:
|ψi〉 = exp[−(αx21 + βx22 + 2γx1x2)/2]. (19)
By solving the equations below:
Jˆa1Jˆ
† |ψi〉 = Jˆa1Jˆ†Jˆ |vac〉1 = 0, (20)
Jˆa2Jˆ
† |ψi〉 = Jˆa2Jˆ†Jˆ |vac〉2 = 0. (21)
We can obtain the expression of the three unknown
parameters as
α =
(1 + λ1)(1 − λ2) + (1− λ1)(1 + λ2)λ212
(1− λ1)(1 − λ2)(1− λ212)
, (22)
β =
(1 − λ1)(1 + λ2) + (1 + λ1)(1 − λ2)λ212
(1− λ1)(1 − λ2)(1− λ212)
, (23)
γ =
2λ12(1 − λ1λ2)
(1 − λ1)(1 − λ2)(1 − λ212)
, (24)
where λ1 = tanh γ1, λ2 = tanh γ2, λ12 = tanh γ12. To
better assess the entanglement of the state, we need to
calculate the von Neumann entropy of the state, which
is defined as S = −Tr1(ρ1 ln ρ1) = −Tr2(ρ2 ln ρ2) (ρ1, ρ2
are the density matrix of two single-mode electromag-
netic fields). Based on the above calculation we get the
following equality by making use of Rendell’s method:
S(η) = ln(η/2) +
1
2
√
η2 + 1 ln
√
η2 + 1 + 1√
η2 + 1− 1 , (25)
where η = sinh 2γ12 cosh∆γ ≥ 0. As a confirmation,
when γ1 = γ2 = 0, Eq. (25) is reduced to:
S = cosh2 γ12 ln(cosh
2 γ12)− sinh2 γ12 ln(sinh2 γ12),
(26)
which is exactly the entropy of a two-mode squeezing
state. It is interesting to find that like the profit function,
the entropy is also determined by only two parameters
γ12 and ∆γ. In addition, we find that the von Neumann
entropy monotonously increases from zero to infinity as
the parameter η increases. Since η increases as either of
the two parameters increases (when γ12 6= 0), the entropy
is an increasing function of both γ12 and ∆γ.
In Li et al.’s entanglement operator, through whole
unitary transformation exp[γ12(a1a2− a†1a†2)], we get the
maximal entangled state as γ12 tends to infinity. Nev-
ertheless, it’s discovered that only by changing the ini-
tial state via local unitary transformation exp[γi(ai
2 −
a†i
2)/2], the maximized entanglement is also achieved as
4long as entanglement exists (i.e. γ12 6= 0, even if it is very
small; see Fig. 3). Obviously, such kind of situation is
impossible in quantum game with Hilbert space of finite
dimensions.
Moreover, we estimate the asymmetry by calculat-
ing the relative difference of the ”position” uncertainties
(which actually represent the width of Gaussian wave
package in each ”position” space) between two parties in
the expression below:
〈
∆x21
〉− 〈∆x22〉
〈∆x21〉+ 〈∆x22〉
= − tanh∆γ
cosh2γ12
. (27)
For fixed and finite γ12, the above expression would
monotonously decreases as ∆γ increases. Due to the ob-
vious fact that the system is completely symmetric when
∆γ = 0, we can simply perceive |∆γ| as a measurement
of the asymmetry of the entangled state, while it’s worth
mentioning that all the discussion concerning asymmetry
above only reflects a variation trend between variables
and the final state.
V. DISCUSSION
So far, we have confined three parameters presented in
the entanglement operator to only two ones, i.e. γ12,∆γ.
In the paragraphs below, specific analysis of the relation
between the game model adopted here and the entangled
state is given.
Since the total profit of two players cannot achieve
the maximum at the Nash equilibrium due to the de-
viation between individual rational choice and collective
optimization requirement in classical Cournot duopoly, it
must be the application of quantum entanglement that
eliminates this dilemma in Li et al.’s scheme. As an ex-
tension of their entangled state, we separately give the
alternation trends of the total profit (u = u1 + u2) and
the entropy S versus γ12,∆γ in the following figures (Fig.
2, Fig. 3), in which the unit of profit is taken as k2/4 ,
namely, the optimal value of the total profit in the clas-
sical cooperation scenario (See Eq. (4)).
It’s obvious to see that both the profit and entropy
function increases as either of the parameters increases
(the condition γ12 6= 0 is necessary here; otherwise there
would be no entanglement between two parties). When
the entropy tends to infinity, the total profit also achieves
its maximal value, and Li et al.’s situation is just a spe-
cial case when ∆γ = 0. Since the entropy is defined as a
measurement of the entanglement of the state, it would
be adequate to explain that the entanglement of the state
does help improve the total profit in Cournot duopoly in-
dependent of the concrete form of the state (i.e. no mat-
ter in which way the entanglement is increasing) as illus-
trated in the previous section, and so long as the maximal
entanglement is attained, the conflict between individual
rationality and collective rationality disappears.
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FIG. 2: when ∆γ is fixed, the total profit u compares to the
entropy S as γ12 changes.
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FIG. 3: when γ12 is fixed, the total profit u compares to the
entropy S as ∆γ changes.
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FIG. 4: when ∆γ is fixed, the function plot between the en-
tropy S and total profit u.
In Fig. 4, we present a more detailed function plot
between the entropy and the total profit. Apparently,
although both quantities have the same increasing trend
as seen in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, the entropy does not deter-
mine the total profit uniquely, i.e. there isn’t a one-to-one
correspondence between such two quantities. In combi-
nation of previous discussion concerning asymmetry, it is
not difficult to find that the increase of asymmetry would
cause the reducing of the total profit if the entanglement
of the state don’t reach the maximum.
Furthermore, the variation of asymmetry also results
in the change of the profit difference between two players
in our quantization scheme. Fig. 5 shows that Player 1
would monopolize the market and get the optimal profit
when ∆γ tends to positive infinity, while on the contrary,
player 2 would become the monopolizer of the market
if ∆γ tends to negative infinity. Therefore, γ1, γ2 can
be separately regarded as the extent to which player 1
and 2 are encouraged (or the corresponding opponents
are suppressed), that is, the larger the parameter is, the
more profit the corresponding player can acquire.
VI. CONCLUSION
We investigate the quantization of games with contin-
uum strategic space by making use of a more general
entanglement operator. For the particular case of sym-
metric scenario, it would turn back to the quantization
scheme put forward by Li et al.. As an extension of their
quantum model, we investigate the relation between the
Nash equilibrium in quantum situation and the entan-
glement of the state more specifically, and find that the
optimal total profit can always be attained as long as
the maximal entanglement is realized. Also we observed
some novel features such as the encouraging and sup-
pressing effect in our quantum model, which completely
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FIG. 5: the variation trend of the profit difference as param-
eters change.
attributes to the asymmetry of the system. Therefore,
in our quantization scheme, the government would have
more choices in managing the market. It actually consti-
tutes a better base for further discussion of game models
involving incomplete information or unequal competition
status.
VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work is supported by the National fundamen-
tal Research Program (Grant No. 2001CB309300), the
National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars
(Grant No. 10425524) and the Project in Quantum In-
formation Technology (Grant No. R-144-000-071-305).
[1] J. Eisert, M. Wilkens, M. Lewenstein, Phys. Rev. Lett.
83 (1999) 3077.
[2] D.A. Meyer, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82 (1999) 1052.
[3] L. Marinatto, T. Weber, Phys. Lett. A 272 (2000) 291.
[4] N.F. Johnson, Phys. Rev. A 63 (2001) 020302.
[5] W.Y. Hwang, D. Ahn, S.W. Hwang, Phys. Rev. A 64
(2001) 064302.
[6] J.L. Chen, L.C. Kwek, C.H. Oh, Phys. Rev. A 65 (2002)
052320.
[7] A. Iqbal, A.H. Toor, Phys. Rev. A 65 (2002) 022306;
Phys. Rev. A 65 (2002) 052328; J. Phys. A: Math. Gen.
37 (2004) 5873.
[8] A.P. Flitney, D. Abbott, Phys. Rev. A 65 (2002) 062318;
J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 38 (2005) 449.
6[9] H. Fort and S. Viola, Phys. Rev. E 69 (2004), 036110.
[10] A. Nawaz and A. H. To, J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 37 (2004)
4437.
[11] S.K. Oumlzdemir, J. Shimamura, N. Imoto, Phys. Lett.
A 325 (2004) 104; Shimamura J, Ozdemir SK, Morikoshi
F, Imoto N, Int. J. Quan. Inform. 2 (2004) 79.
[12] E.W. Piotrowski, J. Sladkowski, 2 (2004) 495; Physica
A, 345 (2005) 185.
[13] Q. Chen, Y. Wang, J.T. Liu, K.L. Wang, Phys. Lett. A
327 (2004) 98.
[14] J. Du, H. Li, X. Xu, M. Shi, J. Wu, X. Zhou, R. Han,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 88 (2002) 137902.
[15] A. Cournot, Researches Into the Mathematical Principles
of the Theory of wealth, Macmillan, New York, 1897.
[16] H. Li, J. Du, S. Massar, Phys. Lett. A 306 (2002) 73-78.
[17] J.F. Du, H. Li, C.Y. Ju, Phys. Rev. E 68 (2003) 016124;
J.F. Du, H. Li, C.Y. Ju, J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 38 (2005)
1559.
[18] C.F. Lo, D. Kiang, Phys. Lett. A 318 (2003) 333, Phys.
Lett. A 321 (2004) 94, Phys. Lett. A 346 (2005) 65.
[19] G. Qin, X. Chen, M. Sun, J.F. Du, J. Phys. A: Math.
Gen. 38 (2005) 4247; X. Chen, G. Qin, X.Y. Zhou, J.F.
Du, Chin. Phys. Lett. 22 (2005) 1033.
[20] G. Qin, X. Chen, M. Sun, X.Y. Zhou, J.F. Du, Phys.
Lett. A 340 (2005) 78.
[21] R.W. Rendell and A.K. Rajagopal, Phys. Rev. A 72,
012330 (2005).
[22] D.F. Walls and G.J. Milburn, Quantum Optics, Springer-
Verlag.
[23] S.L. Braunstein, Review of Modern Physics, 77, 513
(2005).
[24] S.L. Braunstein and H.J. Kimble, Phys. Rev. Lett. 80,
869 (1998).
